周波：上合组织有潜力展现一个非西方主导的美好世界

　　题记：随着西方民主的衰落，北约陷入了僵局，一旦俄乌冲突的团结效应消退，它可能很难找到新的威胁来证明自己存在的合理性。与此同时，非意识形态的上海合作组织正在迅速扩大。它所需避免的，只是不要成为一个需要共同价值观和共同敌人的联盟。

　　如果说有一个“西方 vs 世界其他部分”的鲜明例子，那可能就是北约与上海合作组织(SCO)之间的对比了。北约目前有31个成员国，是世界上最大的军事集团。上合组织则成立于2001年，其成员国分布于欧亚大陆，总人口约占世界人口44%，每年的出口额达数万亿美元。

　　乍看之下，北约似乎与上合组织一样，越来越受欢迎。4月4日，芬兰正式加入北约；此前，3月28日，沙特阿拉伯内阁也批准了沙特以对话伙伴国身份加入上合组织。然而，表象并不等于真相。

　　北约在未来数月乃至数年内将面临的挑战是：如何在不卷入与俄罗斯直接对抗的情况下，继续向乌克兰提供足够的军事支持，而自冷战开始以来，北约一直在努力避免与俄罗斯发生直接对抗。没有人知道俄乌冲突会持续多久。

　　不过，另一个担忧是如何确保战争不会升级为在欧洲中心地带的核冲突。普京对发动核攻击的暗示可能是虚张声势，但他宣布在白俄罗斯部署战术核武器则确有其事。如果战争的最终结果是各方停战，并且乌克兰被进一步分裂，那么问题在于新的“柏林墙”将在哪里出现。

　　北约已陷入僵局，部分原因是西式民主正在衰退。即使北约一直在寻找新的威胁，如在印太地区，来证明其存在的合理性，它也会在民主倒退的同时努力加强其军事手段。

　　值得注意的是，即使俄罗斯对乌克兰发动“特别军事行动”，各国对加入由中俄主导的上合组织的兴趣也未被削弱。去年9月，上合组织峰会在乌兹别克斯坦的撒马尔罕举行，上合组织不仅同意接受伊朗为成员国，还启动了白俄罗斯的加入程序，授予埃及、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔对话伙伴地位，并同意在以后接纳巴林、马尔代夫、阿拉伯联合酋长国、科威特和缅甸为新的对话伙伴。

　　这是上合组织最新一轮的扩员，也是迄今为止规模最大的一次，这轮扩员也最清楚地表明，西方在世界格局中所起的作用正在减少。印度外交部长苏杰生去年表示，“欧洲必须摆脱这样一种观念，即欧洲的问题是世界的问题，但世界的问题不是欧洲的问题。”以具有现实意义的方式来解读这句话，它可能也意味着欧洲必须从这样一种思维模式中走出来——欧洲的战争是世界的战争，世界上的其他战争则不是欧洲的战争。

　　与北约不同，上合组织是开放、包容和非意识形态的。但是，为了可持续发展，上合组织不能被视为“反西方俱乐部”。这种担忧在上合组织存在的大部分时间里一直挥之不去，在俄罗斯与乌克兰交战之际，这种担忧可能会加剧。

　　因此，中国和俄罗斯之间的协调至关重要。中俄都在谈论一个多极化的世界，但它们的世界观不尽相同。中国是全球化的最大受益者，而全球化有赖于现有国际秩序，但俄罗斯对这种秩序感到不满，认为自己是受害者。

　　在与美国关系不断恶化的情况下，中国至少与欧洲保持着说得过去的关系，欧洲将中国同时视为伙伴、竞争者和对手。现在，俄罗斯似乎不可能与欧洲建立这样的关系。

　　然而，只要上合组织不发展成一个需要共同价值观和共同敌人的联盟，这些差异就不会造成太大影响。因此，印度作为一个既接近西方的国家，同时又是上合组织成员的国家是有用的。由于世界第五大经济体加入了上合组织，上合组织的批评者在将其描述为“威权政体组成的集团”之前，必然踌躇不决。

　　安全和发展是上合组织这辆马车的两个“轮子”，但究竟什么影响着安全？20多年前上合组织成立时，安全工作的重点是反恐，这从该组织开展的各种联合反恐演习中就可以看出来。尽管各种恐怖主义活动今天仍然存在，但它们的力量已经式微，不足以需要大规模跨境军事行动干预。

　　相反，真正的挑战是防止成员国之间的战争。印度和巴基斯坦，这两个长期敌对的国家，可能再次发生冲突。同样令人警惕的是，2020年中国和印度的边防部队在加勒万河谷地区发生致命打斗。在撒马尔罕峰会前夕，塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦发生了激烈的边境冲突。同一周，亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆处于另一场战争的边缘。

　　经济发展是将各成员国凝聚在一起的动力。上合组织成员国加上伊朗的GDP总和约占全球GDP的四分之一。伊朗和沙特阿拉伯两大石油出口国的加入，将在经济上加强该组织。

　　对俄罗斯的制裁使非西方国家重新考虑如何确保其财产和投资安全。预计上合组织将逐步增加贸易中的本币结算，这将引领从以美元为基础的单极金融体系向更加多极的金融体系转变。

　　在一个分裂的世界中，上合组织与其他以美国为首的联盟形成鲜明对比。然而，它有一个更艰巨的任务，即证明一个不那么西方化的世界是一个更好的世界。

　　（周波，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员、中国论坛特约专家。本文英文版附后，首发于《南华早报》，中文版译者雷悦雯。本次刊发的中英文版本均经作者最后审定。）

　　附本文英文版：

　　Can an open, inclusive SCO prove that a less-Western world is better than Nato’s vision?

　　Nato is at an impasse as Western democracy declines and it could struggle to find new threats to justify its existence once the unifying effect of the Ukraine war ebbs

　　Meanwhile, the non-ideological Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is expanding rapidly. It just has to avoid becoming an alliance which requires common values and common enemies

　　If there is one shining example of “the West vs the Rest”, it is probably the contrast between Nato and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). With 31 allies banded together, Nato is the largest military bloc in the world. Established in 2001, the SCO sits astride the Eurasian continent and accounts for almost 44 per cent of the world’s population, with trillions of dollars of exports every year.

　　At first glance, both organisations are growing in popularity. This can be seen in Finland’s entry into Nato on April 4 and Saudi Arabia’s cabinet approving a move to join the SCO as a dialogue partner on March 28. However, appearances can be deceiving.

　　The challenge for Nato in the months – and years – to come is how it can continue providing sufficient military support to Ukraine without getting itself involved in a direct confrontation with Russia, something it has been trying to avoid since the onset of the Cold War. No one knows how long the war in Ukraine will last.

　　Another concern, though, is making sure the war does not escalate into a nuclear exchange in the heartland of Europe. Putin’s hints at launching a nuclear attack might be bluffs, but his announcement of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus is certainly true. If the eventual outcome of the war is an armistice that further divides Ukraine, the question is where this new Berlin Wall will be found.

　　Nato has come to an impasse, in part because Western democracy is in decline. Even if Nato has been looking for new threats – say, in the Indo-Pacific – to justify its survival, it will struggle to strengthen its military instruments while democracy is receding.

　　The fact that even Russia’s “special military operation “ in Ukraine has failed to dampen nations’ interest in joining the SCO – an organisation led by China and Russia – is noteworthy. At the SCO summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, last September, the grouping not only agreed to accept Iran as a member state but also started the accession procedure for Belarus, granted dialogue partner status to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and agreed on admitting Bahrain, the Maldives, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Myanmar as new dialogue partners at a later date.

　　This latest round of expansion for the SCO is the largest yet, and it is also the clearest indication that the West’s role in the world is shrinking. Indian External affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said last year that, “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” A useful paraphrasing might be to say that Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s war is the world’s war but the world’s other wars are not Europe’s wars.

　　Unlike Nato, the SCO is open, inclusive and non-ideological. For it to grow sustainably, however, it cannot afford to be seen as an anti-Western club. Concerns about this have lingered for much of the organisation’s existence, and they could heighten at a time when Russia is at war with Ukraine.

　　Therefore, coordination between China and Russia is crucial. Both Beijing and Moscow talk about a multipolar world, yet their world views are not entirely the same. Beijing is the largest beneficiary of the globalisation that depends on the existing international order, but Moscow resents that order and considers itself a victim.

　　As its relations with Washington grow steadily worse, Beijing has at least maintained a plausible relationship with Europe, which sees China as simultaneously a partner, competitor and rival. Such a relationship with Europe appears to be impossible for Moscow now.

　　Nevertheless, as long as the SCO doesn’t grow into an alliance which requires common values and common enemies, such differences are unlikely to matter very much. This is why India, a country that is close to the West and also part of the SCO, is useful. With the world’s fifth-largest economy included in the group, critics of the SCO must think twice before describing it as a grouping of authoritarian regimes.

　　Security and development are said to be two wheels of the SCO cart, but what exactly affects security? When the SCO was formed more than 20 years ago, security efforts focused on counterterrorism. This is seen in the group’s joint counterterrorism exercises. Although all sorts of terrorist activities are still present today, they are not strong enough to require large, cross-border military operations.

　　Instead, the real challenge is to prevent war between member states. India and Pakistan, two longtime foes, could come into conflict again. It is also alarming how Chinese and Indian troops engaged in a deadly brawl in the Galwan Valley in 2020. On the eve of the Samarkand summit, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan experienced violent border clashes. That same week, Armenia and Azerbaijan were on the verge of another war.

　　Economic development is the incentive that binds everyone together. The combined GDP of the SCO plus Iran accounts for about a quarter of global GDP. The entry of Iran and Saudi Arabia, two large oil exporters, will strengthen the organisation economically.

　　The sanctions on Russia will make non-Western countries reconsider how to make their property and investments safe. Gradually, the SCO is expected to increase local currency settlements in trading that will spearhead the transition from a unipolar financial system based on the US dollar to a more multipolar financial system.

　　In a divided world, the SCO stands in contrast to other US-led coalitions. Yet it has a far harder task–to prove a less-Western world is a better world.